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If a franchise agreement gives the franchisor the right to build (or
permit building) another store next door to the one earlier permitted,
it had better say so in clear terms. If it does not - if the franchisor
has not given unto itself the right to be predatory - then it should
be prepared to defend its position on a good faith - that is,
reasonable conduct - basis.
Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 699-799 (S.D.
Fla. 1992)
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INTRODUCTION

A franchise system's success is largely dependent on the national
goodwill reflected in the success of individual franchisees.' To ensure the
success of individual locations, the franchisor typically maintains strict
control over site selection, appearance, suppliers, employee training,
production methods, and advertising.2 The franchisor exerts such control
because successful franchisees make timely royalty, service, and rental
payments. Further, a healthy franchise system will enable the franchisor to
sell new franchise locations based on the success of existing franchisees.
Because the success of an individual franchisee is so vital to the
franchisor, one may wonder why a franchisor sometimes chooses to encroach
upon a franchisee's territorial market by placing a new franchise or opening
a company store, in close proximity to an existing franchisee. The obvious
answer is that the franchisor's ultimate economic concern is the maximization
of royalty fees paid by franchisees. Royalty fees are based upon the gross
sales of each franchise location.3 Successful franchisees serve as a marketgauge for the placement of additional locations in the same geographic area.4
Thus, the franchisor reasons that two locations will generate more gross sales
than one, without regard to the diminished gross sales or net profit of the
pre-existing franchisee.
In many cases, however, the existing franchisee's decrease in sales may
obliterate an already slim profit margin. Further, the franchisor's decision
to invade the franchisee's market often ignores years of franchisee loyalty
1. The franchisor wants to ensure that the patron who stops for a burger on the turnpike
in Maryland will receive food of the same quality upon arrival in Florida and that the family
who eats in the suburb location will also choose to stop in for lunch while in the city.
2. In franchising, the advertising programs, employee training classes, production
methods, and goodwill are an established component of the franchise package. Thus, the
franchisee's main obstacle to a profitable franchise operation is the ability to implement the
franchisor's "proven" formula for success. This is particularly true for established franchise
systems such as Burger King, McDonalds, or Wendy's, which most likely enjoy a low
franchisee failure rate.
3. Harold Brown, Franchising.The 20-Year Agreement, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1992, at 3.

"For the franchisor, it is perfectly logical to seek market penetration where success has been
empirically demonstrated. To share in the success of the first franchisee, the additional
franchises will be located as close as possible, with potentially disastrous impact on the
original dealer." Id.
4. Id. Generally, fast-food franchises charge "5 percent of gross sales for royalties and
2 percent for national advertising." Id.
5. Id. "In today's market a typically successful fast-food franchise ... [operates on] an
8 percent net profit." Id. A decrease in sales of eight percent eliminates a franchisee's profit
margin. Id. If a franchisee were aware of the likelihood of encroachment prior to signing an
agreement, even a slightly lower decrease most likely would affect a franchisee's decision to
invest in a franchise location, given alternative investment vehicles. Id.
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and the potential damage to its national business reputation in recruiting new
franchisees. Nevertheless, the franchisor's cost-benefit analysis most likely
reveals that the benefit from increased gross revenues outweighs the cost of
battling a franchisee, as well as the detriment to the franchisor's ability to
recruit new franchisees. 6
While in the abstract the franchisor's reasoning is easily explained, the
franchisee is left wondering why the franchisor, once perceived as an ally,
has suddenly become the enemy. In most franchise negotiations, as well as
in the franchise agreement itself, the franchisor promises to do everything
possible to aid the franchisee. Yet, the franchisee may find that the franchise
agreement covers only the franchisee's specific location or grants the
franchisor discretion to open subsequent locations at will. Nevertheless, it
is unlikely that even a franchisee without an exclusive geographic area would
imagine that the franchisor would act to diminish the franchisee's success by
encroaching upon the franchisee's market.
In contrast, the franchisor most likely reasons that it is simply exercising
its contractual rights as provided in the franchise agreement. The franchisor
may believe that it is not entering the franchisee's market or that economic
synergy created by multiple locations will benefit the existing franchisee.
Regardless of the franchisor's motives, the franchise agreement provides the
starting point from which to judge the franchisor's actions. In situations
where the franchise agreement explicitly defines the franchisee's territorial
rights, the franchisee should have the burden of proof to show that the
encroachment violates the franchisor's duty of good faith. However, where
the franchise agreement is silent or ambiguous, the franchisor should bear the
burden of proving that the placement of additional franchise locations is
within the reasonable expectation of the parties. These scenarios are
examined in detail herein.7

6. The cost-benefit equation will almost always weigh inthe franchisor's favor when the
disgruntled franchisee has inferior bargaining power. For example, a franchisee who had
become heavily indebted from the purchase of one franchise location would be hard pressed
to battle the franchisor's high-priced attorneys. However, this might not be the case if a
franchisor encroaches upon a multiple-unit owner, who possesses the financial means to
contest the franchisor's actions.
7. Unfortunately, the burden of proof analysis cannot be based on court decisions
concerning the encroachment issue. Encroachment cases typically reach appellate courts on
interlocutory appeals over summary judgment. E.g., Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F.
Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Scheck I] (addressing the encroachment issue in the
summary judgment context), reconsideration denied, 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
These courts only address the burden of proof as applied to summary judgment and do not
address the burdens for establishing the reasonableness of encroachment. See id. In part VI,
this article addresses the ultimate burden regarding encroachment in the legislative context.
This proposal also could be applied by courts in the common law context if appropriate
legislation does not exist.
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Before addressing the reasonableness of franchisor encroachment, part II
of this article details the parameters of the implied covenant of good faith.
Part III explores how the language of the franchise agreement is affected by
the Statute of Frauds, merger, parole evidence, and the general liability
release. Part IV examines the application of the implied covenant of good
faith to both explicit and ambiguous franchise agreements. The degree of
protection express franchise agreements provide to franchisors is analyzed in
part V. Part VI discusses the doctrines of fiduciary duty and unconscionability as alternatives to the implied covenant of good faith. Part
VII details pending legislation addressing the encroachment issue and
suggests an alternative legislative approach. Finally, part VIII forecasts the
future of encroachment and the implied covenant of good faith.
II.

THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

The implied covenant of good faith protects the reasonable expectations
of parties involved in a contractual relationship.' The covenant places an
overarching duty "upon each party to do nothing destructive of the other
party's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract and to do everything that the
contract presupposes they will do to accomplish its purpose."9 Similar
language is found in the Restatement of Contracts, section 205, which
dictates that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement ... [by emphasizing]
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party."' ° This duty to act in good faith also serves
as a prohibition of bad faith actions because good faith, by definition,
"excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith'
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness.""
The implied covenant, while seemingly a comprehensive obligation on
contracting parties, is limited in scope. Florida courts historically have
refused to apply the covenant of good faith in "derogation of the express

8. See Robert T. Joseph, Do FranchisorsOwe a Duty of Competence?, 46 Bus. LAW.
471, 471 (1991); Lee A. Rau, Implied Obligations in Franchising:Beyond Terminations, 47
Bus. LAW. 1053, 1053 (1992) (discussing the implied covenant of good faith).
9. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that the
implied covenant of good faith "prohibited actions by [the franchisor] that would preclude
profitable operation of the franchise or coerce franchise owners to terminate their agreements
on terms favorable to [the franchisor]"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 917 (1980).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) at 99. "[E]very contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979).
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terms of a contract."' 2 In short, parties can circumvent the implied
covenant of good faith through contracts that specifically authorize actions
that might otherwise violate the covenant. For example, where a franchise
agreement grants the franchisor absolute discretion to establish new
franchises at any location, courts refuse to apply the covenant, even if the
new location significantly harms the existing franchisee's profit margin. 3
Courts base such decisions on the constitutional right of freedom from state
interference in contractual relationships."
The refusal of modem courts to utilize the implied covenant of good faith
to modify express contractual clauses illustrates the upper bounds of the
covenant's application. The difficulty in determining the covenant's lower
boundary arises when construing franchise agreements that contain vague
language or are silent regarding the franchisor's discretion to locate new
franchises. For example, where the franchise agreement grants the franchisee
the right to operate at only a specific location and includes no language
regarding the franchisor's ability to open new locations, exactly where can
the franchisor place a new franchise? Within two miles? Around the comer?
Clearly, the franchisee does not expect the franchisor to establish a franchise
location next door. Beyond the obvious, however, it is difficult to measure
exactly how much protection the franchisee should reasonably expect in the
absence of a defining clause.
III.

BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS: PAROLE EVIDENCE, STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, MERGER, AND THE GENERAL LIABILITY RELEASE

Prior to executing a franchise agreement, the parties often engage in
lengthy negotiations during which the franchisor sells the franchisee on the

12. Fickling v. Burger King Corp., 843 F.2d 1386, [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) 9099, at 18,825 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply the implied
covenant of good faith against clear language contained in a franchise agreement); Scheck v.
Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 695 (S.D. Fla. 1992) [Scheck II] (affirming the oft-cited
rule of law that the covenant of good faith cannot be implied in derogation of the express
terms of a contract) (quoting Fickling, [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) 9099, at 18,825). For further discussion of the covenant of good faith, see infra text
accompanying notes 71-88.
13. Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 92-C5852, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334, at *19 (N.D.
I11.Jan. 10, 1994) (refusing to use the implied covenant of good faith where encroachment
would cause the franchisee's gross sales to decrease between 27% and 40%), mot. denied,
count dismissed, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 338 (N.D. I1l. Jan. 10, 1994). For further discussion
of the court's position, see infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
14. See McDonald's Corp. v. Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597, 605 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (declaring
invalid the retroactive application of a statutory provision defining unreasonable encroachment); see also Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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franchise system. 5 The sales process may include literature boasting of the
franchise system's success and the assistance that the franchisor will provide.
In many cases, the franchisee also will receive oral representations about the
franchisor's policies and practices, as well as statements regarding the
franchisor's future treatment of the franchisee once in operation. In addition,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Rules,' 6 and in some situations state
laws, 17 mandate disclosure on territorial protection. Problems arise when
these statements are ambiguous or conflict with representations made prior
to executing the franchise contract. The extent to which these representations
bind the parties after execution of the franchise agreement is determined by
the doctrine of merger, 8 the parole evidence rule, 19 the general liability
release,20 and the Statute of Frauds."
15. Brown, supra note 3, at 28. The extent of negotiations between franchisee and
franchisor will most likely depend on the strength of the franchisor. Id. Representatives of
a new franchise system will be willing to negotiate the terms of the agreement in an effort to

sign on new franchisees, while established franchise systems, some of which have a waiting
period before an approved franchisee will receive a location, will probably assume a "take it

or leave it" posture in negotiations. Id.
16. Trade Regulation Rule: Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (1995), dictates that a

violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act occurs when a franchisor fails to furnish a
prospective franchisee with a written statement regarding whether the franchisee is "[g]ranted
territorial protection by the franchisor, by which, with respect to a territory or area,... the
franchisor will not establish another, or more than any fixed number of, franchises or
company-owned outlets."
17. E.g., IND. CODE § 23-2-2.5-10 (1993) (requiring "[a] statement as to whether

franchisees are granted an area or territory within which the franchisor agrees not to operate
or grant additional franchises for the operation of the franchise business or in which the

franchisor will operate or grant franchises for the operation of no more than a specified
number of additional franchise businesses"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-3 (1993) (requiring "[a]
statement as to whether franchisees or subfranchisors receive an exclusive area or territory").
18. The doctrine of merger provides that "when the parties have reduced their contract
to writing, all previous or contemporaneous oral or written negotiations are merged in it and

its terms cannot be varied, contradicted, added to, or subtracted from." Brennan v. Carvel
Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 807 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Williams v. Pittsfield Lime & Stone Co.,
154 N.E. 572, 573-74 (1927)).
19. An agreement is deemed "integrated" when the writing comprehensively appears

complete or represents the final agreement between the parties. Happy Dack Trading Co. v.
Agro-Industries, 602 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). If integrated, "the clear and
unambiguous terms of a valid... written instrument cannot be contradicted or varied by prior
or contemporaneous extrinsic oral or written evidence." Id.
20. A release extinguishes a party's rights to "any and all claims, demands, causes of
action and liabilities of every kind and nature, known and unknown, suspected and
unsuspected." Western Chance No. 2, Inc. v. KFC Corp., 734 F. Supp. 1529, 1539 (D. Ariz.
1990) [hereinafter Western Chance I], aff'd in part and reversed in part, 957 F.2d 1538 (9th

Cir. 1992).
21. The Statute of Frauds mandates that "no suit or action shall be maintained on certain
classes of contracts or engagements unless there shall be a note or memorandum thereof in
writing signed by the party to be charged or by his authorized agent." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 662 (6th ed. 1990). This requirement is imposed upon all "contracts which
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Statute of Frauds and
parole evidence rule to determine a franchise dispute based on pre-execution
oral representations in Western Chance No. 2, Inc. v. KFC Corp. (Western
Chance II).22 The franchisee,23 Western Chance,24 maintained that it held
exclusive territorial rights to all of Tucson, Arizona. In Western Chance No.
2 v. KFC Corp. (Western Chance I), Western Chance filed suit when KFC
opened a company-owned store that was located beyond the express one-anda-half mile exclusive territory of the franchisee's locations, but still within
the city of Tucson.25 Western Chance argued (and KFC denied) that its
written franchise agreements were preceded by an oral representation from
a KFC representative that Western Chance also held exclusive territorial
rights to all of Tucson.26
Although the district court found that the parties had reached an oral
agreement, the court granted KFC's motion for summary judgment and held
that the oral agreement violated the Statute of Frauds because the agreement
was either perpetual or for a twenty-year term. 27 The district court further
held that the parole evidence rule prohibited proof of the oral agreement
because the express terms of each franchise agreement, granting a one-and-ahalf mile exclusive territory for each location, conflicted with the oral
agreement's exclusive grant for all of Tucson.28 In refusing to permit the
franchisee's arguments 29 to overcome either the Statute of Frauds or the
parole evidence rule, the court emphasized that the case involved a
sophisticated franchisee who had received legal counseling throughout the
30
twenty-five-year franchise relationship.

cannot, by their terms, be performed within a year." Id.
22. 957 F.2d 1538 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Western Chance II].
23. The franchisee, Western Chance, is a corporation comprised of four shareholders.
Western Chance 1, 734 F. Supp. at 1531. Although portions of the opinion detail the actions
of individual shareholders, I will singularly refer to the corporation as the franchisee.
24. Western Chance began its relationship with KFC by executing agreements for six
franchise restaurants in Tucson, Arizona. Id. The parties executed a separate agreement for
each outlet, granting the franchisee an exclusive territory within a specific distance from each
franchise, as well as right of first application on new KFC restaurants located near the
franchisee's existing locations. Id.
25. Id. at 1526; see also Western Chance II, 957 F.2d at 1539, 1540.
26. Western Chance II, 957 F.2d at 1539.
27. Western Chance , 734 F. Supp. at 1536.
28. Id. at 1538. The court also addressed a general release executed by the parties prior
to the instant dispute. The issue of release is discussed infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
29. Western Chance argued that letters allegedly mentioning the exclusive territory for all
of Tucson, or in the alternative promissory estoppel, should overcome the Statute of Frauds
issue. Western Chance I, 734 F. Supp. at 1536, 1537. Further, Western Chance argued that
the franchise agreements' integration clauses should be ignored because they were boilerplate
provisions. Id. at 1538.
30. Western Chance began its relationship with KFC in 1965 when it purchased options
to open six KFC locations in Tucson, Arizona. Id. at 1531. It subsequently exercised five
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding regarding the
Statute of Frauds based on a curious analysis of the facts.3' The court
reasoned that even an indefinite oral agreement might not violate the Statute
of Frauds' writing requirement if a refusal by Western Chance to open a
subsequent location within the agreement's first year could have terminated
the franchisee's exclusive territorial rights.32 The court reasoned that this
"slight possibility" of performance within one year could remove the
agreement from the Statute of Frauds.33 If, however, the term was twenty
years in length, as alleged by KFC, or perpetual, then the agreement would
violate the Statute of Frauds. 34 The court held that this issue concerned a
disputed material fact and reversed the lower court's ruling. 35
The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court erred in holding that
the "oral exclusivity agreement and the outlet franchise agreements were
inherently irreconcilable."3 6 The circuit court did not question the validity
of the clause granting each franchise location a one-and-a-half mile exclusive
territory.37 However, it reasoned that exclusive rights to an entire city, held
by a franchisee owning six franchise outlets, did not necessarily contradict
the express terms of the written agreements, which concerned only the
individual locations.38 The court found that the terms of the oral agreement
and the franchise agreement were not necessarily "irreconcilable" because the
oral agreement's promise of "exclusive rights to an entire city concern[ed]
a different matter" than addressed in the written agreement.39 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
40

KFC.

While it may appear at first glance that the Western Chance opinions
simply reiterate black letter law regarding the Statute of Frauds and the
parole evidence rule, the cases actually illustrate several fundamental
problems with franchise relationships. For example, the Western Chance
opinions implicitly differ on the effect of the franchisee's level of sophistication. The district court in Western Chance I specifically noted the

of the six options, and over the years opened several more locations. Id. at 1531-35.
31. Western Chance II, 957 F.2d at 1538.
32. Id. at 1541.
33. Id. The court stated that "[t]he mere possibility that performance can be completed
within one year - even if not contemplated by the parties - is usually sufficient to remove
the agreement from the Statute of Frauds." Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1542.
36. Id. at 1543.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1544. The court refused to comment "on the proper outcome of the litigation"
and did not address any issues concerning the burden of proof. Id.
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franchisee's high level of sophistication, demonstrated by the fact that the
franchisee's initial operation of six outlets had grown to over twelve locations
and the franchisee had utilized legal counsel through most of the relationship.4 In fact, the franchisee after advice of counsel had signed several
documents that released KFC from any claims based on prior representations,42 as well as, subsequent franchise agreement amendments that
detailed only the territorial grants for each individual location 43 without
questioning the existence of the citywide exclusivity.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Western Chance 11 conspicuously
fails to mention the franchisee's business acumen. This omission may,
however, reflect the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgment of the realities of
franchising rather than a lack of sophistication in analysis. Perhaps, the court
concluded that KFC acted predatorially once the market became profitable
by opening company-owned outlets in Tucson.44 Surely, the court acknowledged the franchisee's testimony indicating that they did not question
the grant of exclusivity because "we thought we had a market, [and that] the
corporation [KFC] would not come in and ask to build stores. We thought
we had the market of Tucson, Arizona and that was our market. 45 The
court probably reasoned that even sophisticated franchisees rely on such
representations and expect that the franchisor is acting in good faith despite
unwillingness to place the representation in writing.
Sophisticated franchisees might indeed rely on oral franchisor representations of the apparent guaranty of success associated with an established and
reputable franchisor. Reliance on the franchisor's reputation for good faith
and fair dealing plays an even greater role in cases like Western Chance
where the franchise relationship had prospered over time. Western Chance
probably felt there was no reason to question the agreement that KFC
dutifully had adhered to for over twenty years, while granting the

41. Western Chance 1,734 F. Supp. at 1537-38.
42. Id. at 1534-35.
43. Id. at 1532.

44. The court's concluding paragraph remarked that "a franchise relationship that ran
smoothly for many years has now become bitter and adversary." Western Chance1M, 957 F.2d
at 1544. Based on the court's pro-franchisee opinion and omission of the sophistication issue,
it seems plausible that the court believed that KFC was now invading the Tucson market
despite years of a profitable relationship between the parties. It also is interesting to note that
the franchise relationship ran smoothly for 22 years until a dispute over the termination of one
franchise location that had been closed by the county health department. See Western Chance
1,734 F. Supp. at 1535. Only after a general release was executed during the settlement of
this dispute did KFC begin making efforts to open company-owned locations in Tucson. See
id. at 1536. It seems ironic that KFC's efforts to place company-owned outlets in Tucson did
not begin until after the contested dispute and signing of the general release. See id. at 153536.
45. Western Chance I, 734 F. Supp. at 1533 (emphasis added).
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franchisee's numerous requests to open new franchise locations. Thus, the
initial lure of success, complemented by KFC's past conduct, may have
ameliorated Western Chance's concern about getting franchisor promises in
writing.
Even if the franchisee can overcome the Statute of Frauds, the franchisor
still is well armored by the parole evidence rule and the doctrine of merger.
"In Florida, it is well settled that representations made before or during the
signing of a contract ... are presumed to have merged into the written
agreement. 46
Franchise agreements typically contain a merger, or
"integration," clause clearly stating that the written franchise agreement
encompasses the entire agreement between the parties and "there are no
representations beyond its four comers."4' 7
Most jurisdictions give
conclusive validity to merger clauses, 4 allowing the parole evidence rule
to bar extrinsic evidence that contravenes the express and unambiguous
language of the agreement.
In Schubot v. McDonalds Corp., the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida found that the parole evidence rule barred admission of
prior oral representations. 9 In Schubot, the franchisee owned two5 °
McDonalds' franchises and alleged that McDonalds represented that he would
be considered for any new franchises in the area."1 McDonalds argued that
its franchise agreement specifically declined to grant exclusive territorial
rights.5 2 In refusing to credit the prior representations, 53 the court reasoned
that "verbal statements between contracting parties prior to, or during,
execution of a contract merge into the subsequent written contract., 54 Thus,
the court found that the written franchise agreement constituted the final and
conclusive agreement between the parties.5
The franchisee in Schubot might have found success by emphasizing his
status as a multiple-unit owner. Under Western Chance H, a franchisee can
argue that a representation of territorial exclusivity to a multiple-unit owner
does not conflict with territorial clauses in the individual agreements for each
location. 6
Unequivocal language concerning certain aspects of the
territorial issue, such as a geographic radius for the individual outlet, may
46. Schubot v. McDonalds Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
47. Joseph, supra note 8,at 499.
48. Schubot, 757 F.Supp. at 1358.
49. Id.at 1356.
50. Id. at 1353. The franchisee acquired these locations from his father, a former
McDonalds franchisee, who once had owned 20 locations. Id.
51. Id.at 1358.
52. Id. at 1354.
53. Id.at 1358.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. See Western Chance II,957 F.2d at 1543.
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create ambiguity as to whether the franchisee possesses an exclusive territory
for a collective holding of franchise locations. It is often the franchisor's
error in not covering the field of contingencies that creates ambiguity in
unanticipated situations and allows the admission of extrinsic evidence. 7
The franchisor can attempt to bar claims based on prior representations
by including a release in the franchise agreement. For example, the
franchisee in Schubot acquired the outlets from his father who owned twenty
McDonalds, as well as the exclusive right to all new restaurants and the
expansion of existing restaurants in Palm Beach County, Florida. 8 When
his father arranged to sell eighteen locations to the McDonalds Corp. and
transfer two to his son, he allegedly did so on the promise that McDonalds
would consider his son for all future expansions in Palm Beach County. 9
However, when the franchisee executed the new agreements with McDonalds
for the two outlets, they contained releases that extinguished the rights held
by the franchisee's father and disclaimed any oral or written representations
not part of the new written franchise agreements.6 ° The court found that
such "clauses releasing parties and disclaiming liabilities

. . .

overcome any

oral representations not contained in the written franchise agreements. '
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to McDonalds on the
franchisee's claim of fraud in the inducement because the representations
were not part of the final franchise agreements. 2
The presence of a release in the franchise agreement provides the
franchisor with a license to "puff' in the negotiation process. The release
allows the franchisor a substantial degree of liberty in boasting about the
success of its franchise system in both written and oral representations made
during the negotiation process. Even the falsity of alleged representations
will not save the franchisee because "reliance upon [such] oral represen-

57. Even if the franchisor does "cover the field," this author believes that the implied
covenant of good faith should, in certain circumstances, overcome even express, comprehensive language. For example, if the franchise agreement allows the franchisor to open new
locations at any site other than that covered by the agreement, the franchisor should not be
permitted to open a competing outlet next door. See Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. at 549 (citations
omitted).
58. Schubot, 757 F. Supp. at 1353.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1354. The agreements stated that "[the franchisee] hereby releases and forever
discharges McDonalds Corporation, and all of its subsidiaries and affiliates ... from all
claims, losses, liabilities and causes of action." Id. Further, each license and lease stated that
"[t]his license ... constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes any and
all prior and contemporaneous, oral or written, agreements or understandings of the parties."
Id.
61. Id. at 1356 (citing Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 829 (D. Minn. 1989)).
62. Id. at 1356.
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tations ... is unreasonable if the party enters into a subsequent
agreement. 6 3 Thus, the power of the release again illustrates that the
franchisee must "get it in writing" in order to be protected in subsequent
disputes.
Although a release provides the franchisor substantial protection this
power is not without boundaries. In Florida, a general release typically
covers only "claims or demands which have matured at the time of its
execution." ' In the encroachment context, the release will be ineffective
because the franchisee's action to enjoin the encroachment generally will not
be ripe until after the execution of the release.65
The inability of a release to foreclose an encroachment action also
illustrates why the Florida Franchise Act66 and Little FTC Act 67 generally
are not utilized in encroachment claims. Both prohibit intentional misrepresentations during the sale of a franchise. 68 Apparently, franchisees are
unable to support claims that the franchisor misrepresented or failed to
disclose its intentions of encroachment.69 Franchisees most likely cannot
support this action because the encroachment may not occur until well after
the execution of the franchise agreement. In such cases, it will be difficult
for the franchisee to establish that the franchisor intended to take such actions
during the time period covered by the Florida Franchise Act.70

63. Id. (citing 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1367 (E.D. Mich.
1984)).
64. Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. at 547 (examining the validity of releases in the encroachment
context) (quoting Sottile v. Gaines Constr. Co., 281 So. 2d 558, 561 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973)).
65. Id. (explaining that the franchisee's action to enjoin the establishment of the
encroaching location would not be ripe until the franchisor allowed the new location to open,
or at a minimum, when the encroaching franchise agreement was signed).
66. FLA. STAT. § 817.416 (1995).
67. FLA. STAT. § 559.80 (1995).

68. FLA.

STAT.

§§ 817.416(2)(a); 559.809(2) (1995).

69. Florida cases concerning encroachment do not address the applicability of the Florida
Franchise Act or the Little FTC Act. See, e.g., Fickling, 843 F.2d at 1386; Schubot, 757 F.
Supp. at 1351; Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. at 543. Presumably, the franchisee did not utilize the
Acts either because of an inability to establish a violation during the negotiation process or
because the encroachment issue did not arise until after execution of the franchise agreement.
70. Nevertheless, the Florida Franchise Act and Little FTC Act are available to the
franchisee who can establish the franchisor misrepresented or failed to disclose its intentions
to open new (encroaching) locations. This issue receives limited discussion here, since the
Acts currently have not been utilized by Florida's franchisees in the encroachment context.
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IV. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND THE EXCLUSIVE
TERRITORY CLAUSE

A.

Explicit TerritorialClauses

Even in situations where the language of a franchise agreement clearly
defines the franchisee's exclusive territory, it is doubtful that the franchisee
reasonably would expect that a literal application of the clause would harm
profitability. During the negotiation process, the franchisee begins to look
upon the franchisor as an ally, as the franchise salesperson recounts all of the
services that the franchisor provides: employee training, on-site reviews,
quality suppliers, advertising, and site selection expertise. Certainly, the
franchisee's perception is not unreasonable as the franchisor assumes an
active role in achieving an apparently common goal, that is, the success of
the franchise. This view is augmented by the franchisor's need to maintain
a healthy franchise system through ensuring the success of its franchisees.
Even in cases where the franchise agreement provides the franchisor with
absolute discretion in locating other franchises, the franchisee often feels that
the franchisor's placement of a competing franchisee within its immediate
market violates the good faith that previously had permeated their relationship.
For example, in Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp.,7I the franchisee argued that
the placement of a new outlet, which was projected to cause a twenty-seven
to forty percent loss in sales for the Cohn franchise,72 violated the franchise
agreement's implied covenant of good faith. The agreement,73 however,
granted the franchisor the unfettered right to open new locations.74 The
court found the franchise agreement's clause that allowed the franchisor to
open a new location anywhere to be unassailable. 75 The court reasoned that
"[t]he general rule '[regarding the covenant of good faith]' is plainly subject

71. No. 92-C5852, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334 at *19 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1994), mot.
denied, count dismissed, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 338 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 10, 1994).
72. Id. at *2. Upon the franchisor's suggestion the plaintiffs hired the National Research
Corporation (NRC) to assess the impact of the new locations. Id. The NRC concluded that
the new outlets would result in a 27-40% loss in sales for the franchisee. Id. at *22. The
franchisor rejected the figures as inaccurate. Id.
73. Plaintiffs also alleged that the franchisor made oral representations that franchisees
could object to the placement of new locations by illustrating adverse impact upon existing
locations. Id. at *12. The court ruled that the parole evidence rule barred the admission of
the oral representation because the explicit terms of the franchise agreement left no room for
susceptibility or alternative meanings. Id. at * 12-* 13.
74. The franchise agreement stated in relevant part "[the franchisor] ...in its sole and
absolute discretion, has the right to grant other licenses ... both within and outside the
restaurant trading area." Id. at *8.
75. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
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to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of the contract,
grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct which would otherwise
have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 76 Although the court sympathized with the franchisee, it felt
compelled to enforce the plain language of the contract. The court remarked
that "[a] court can't redraft the agreement simply because one of the parties
may have made an unwise bargain. 7 7
The Cohn court's refusal to apply the covenant of good faith to a
franchise agreement's unambiguous territorial clause is not without precedent.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Domed Stadium Hotel v. Holiday
Inns78 examined a territorial clause that gave the franchisor the right to
construct and operate other outlets at any location other than those licensed
to the franchisee. 79 The court found that Holiday Inn's operation of another
hotel80 within the city of New Orleans did not breach the agreement's
implied covenant of good faith.8 ' The court held that the implied covenant
of good faith could not be used to overcome the express terms of the
franchise agreement that explicitly granted the franchisor the right to open
other hotels at any site other than the specific location granted to the
franchisee. 2
Similarly, in Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, 3 the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the franchisor from opening a new location within one mile of the
plaintiff's franchise location." The court found the franchise agreement's
grant of absolute discretion to the franchisor to locate new outlets barred the

76. Id. at *14 (quoting Carma Developers v. Marathon Dev. Cal., 826 P.2d 710, 728
(1992)).
77. Id. at *21 (citing Waterbury v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 820 F.2d 1479, 1481 (9th Cir.
1987)). Ironically, the court's ruling implies that a 27-40% decrease in sales resulting from
franchisor encroachment was not beyond the reasonable expectation of the parties. See id.
78. 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984).
79. The agreement stated in relevant part that the franchisor is enabled "to construct and
operate one or more Holiday Inns at any place other than on the cite licensed hereby." Id.
at 483 n.1.
80. Holiday Inn already operated one location in New Orleans prior to its relationship
with the franchisee. Id. The location at issue, located between Holiday Inn's French Quarter
hotel and the franchisee's downtown hotel, constituted the third Holiday Inn hotel in New
Orleans. Id. at 483.
81. Id. An impact study conducted by a private research firm concluded that the
franchisee would lose 12-15% of its occupancy during the three-month tourist season or three
to five percent over a year. Id. The study also stated that the continued growth of tourism
in New Orleans and aggressive marketing by Holiday Inn could further reduce the impact.

Id.
82. Id. at 484.
83. 496 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
84. Id. at 1159.
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plaintiff's action based on the implied covenant of good faith. 5
The three foregoing cases, Cohn, Domed Stadium, and Patel provide the
courts with easy routes to dismiss franchisees' actions. Although the Cohn
court openly sympathized with the franchisee, it declined to depart from
established contract law, which prohibits application of the covenant to
express and unambiguous contract terms. The courts' unwillingness to bend
the rules ignores the unique nature of franchise relationships. The courts
blindly assumed that because the express provision is part of the franchise
agreement, both parties must have possessed the same expectations
concerning its application. In reality, franchisees presume that while the
franchisor will continue to expand the franchise system, such growth would
not include the cannibalization of existing franchisees' markets.
In some circumstances, it may appear that the franchisor's exercise of
discretion in locating a new franchise does not offend the franchisee's
reasonable expectations.86 For example, in Domed Stadium, it seems most
unlikely that a franchisee would reasonably expect that Holiday Inn would
refrain from opening another hotel in the entire city of New Orleans. While
another hotel might diminish the existing franchisee's gross profits by only
a few percentage points, even such a small decrease could drastically reduce
the franchisee's already slim profit margin. However, in Cohn, where
encroachment was forecasted to decrease an existing franchisee's sales by at
least twenty-seven percent, and up to forty percent,87 the situation is
explicitly clear. Notwithstanding the principle that parties may contractually
allow behavior that ordinarily would offend the covenant of good faith,88
the franchisee probably would not expect the franchisor to interfere with the
"fruits of the contract" to such a degree that would render the tree completely
barren.
B. Ambiguous TerritorialClauses
Judicial interpretation of territorial rights clauses becomes even more
difficult when the franchise agreement fails to outline the parties' rights in
unequivocal language. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Photovest

85. Id. at 1161. The agreement stated in relevant part that "DUNKIN' DONUTS, in its
sole discretion, has the right to operate or franchise other DUNKIN' DONUTS SHOPS under,
and to grant other licenses in, and to, any or all of the PROPRIETARY MARKS, in each case
on such terms and conditions as DUNKIN' DONUTS deems acceptable." Id. at 1159.
86. Arguably, where the franchisee negotiates the exclusive territory clause (for example,
the franchisee negotiates to extend the exclusive territory from one mile to two), it could be
inferred that encroachment is within the franchisee's reasonable expectations. Even in such
cases, it is most unlikely that the franchisee would expect that franchisor encroachment would
result in the elimination of its entire profit margin.
87. Cohn, No. 92-C5852, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334 at *22.
88. See cases cited supra note 12.
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Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.,89 examined a franchise agreement that did not
provide the franchisee with an exclusive territory.90 In Photovest, the
franchisor encroached upon the franchisee's locations in an effort to coerce
the franchisee to terminate the franchise agreements on terms favorable to the
franchisor. 9' The franchisor saturated the franchisee's market areas with
new outlets, reduced services to the franchisee, and prohibited the franchisee
from seeking lower photo processing costs. 92 Prior to executing the
franchise agreements, the franchisor had represented that each location
constituted a "market area" that would be free from encroachment within a
two mile radius.93 Although the representations were not incorporated into
the franchise agreement, the court reasoned that "the implied covenant
prohibited actions by the [franchisor] which would preclude profitable
operation of the franchise. 94 Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that the franchisor breached the implied covenant of good
faith.95
Beginning in January 1991, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida 6 analyzed a series of cases involving incomplete
territorial clauses. These decisions, in concert with Photovest, provide hope

89. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979).
90. The Photovest opinion does not provide the language of the franchise agreement
regarding territorial rights. Id. One commentator has noted that the Photovest facts are
identical to a subsequent decision involving the Fotomat Corporation. See David J. Kaufman,
The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 26, 1993, at 3. Thus,
for analytical purposes, we can assume the language to be as follows: "FOTOMAT hereby
grants to OPERATOR the exclusive rights to operate as a retailer of photographic supplies and
photoprocessing services ...in a FOTOMAT MERCHANDISING ISLAND." See Eichman
v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 164 (9th Cir. 1989).
91. Photovest, 606 F.2d at 728.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 716.
94. Id. at 728. The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a contrary conclusion on facts
virtually identical to those in Photovest. See Eichman, 880 F.2d at 149. The Eichman court
found the franchise agreement was clear and unambiguous. Id. at 164. Accordingly, the court
refused to read a grant of exclusive territory into the agreement where none existed. Id. The
Eichman court failed to consider that the agreement clearly did not grant the franchisor
unfettered discretion in locating new franchises. Further, the Eichman decision is very
convoluted and thus, does not provide strong precedent value for franchisors. See Kaufnan,
supra note 90, at 3. Kaufman, a New York attorney and franchise expert, states that "[t]he
decision is somewhat twisted and inherently confusing. While it recognizes that an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract, it goes on to suggest that
Eichman's case was not the type of case that could be brought for breach of the implied
covenant[] without ever explaining why." Id. Thus, Kaufman cautions that "it would be
perilous" for franchisors to rely on the case. Id.
95. Photovest, 606 F.2d at 728.
96. The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida hears numerous franchise
disputes by virtue of its physical location. Burger King Corp., one of the largest franchisors
in the United States, is headquartered in Miami, Florida.
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that the courts will, at least, protect a franchisee's reasonable expectations in
situation's where the franchise agreement falls short in outlining the degree
of franchisor discretion. In Scheck 17' the franchisee sued when the
franchisor approved the operation of a new98 Burger King two miles from
franchisee's location. Burger King relied primarily on its franchise
agreement, which "specifically decline[d] to 'grant or imply' to Scheck 'any
area, market, or territorial rights." '99 Nevertheless, Judge Hoeveler refused
to grant Burger King's motion for summary judgment °° because while the
agreement expressly denied Scheck territorial rights, it did not grant Burger
King absolute discretion in locating new restaurants.' 0'
The Scheck I court's ruling rested on the silence of the agreement
regarding Burger King's right to open new franchises.'0 2 The court
reasoned that "[t]he express denial of an exclusive territorial interest to
Scheck does not necessarily imply a wholly different right to Burger King the right to open other proximate franchises at will regardless of their effect
on [Scheck's] operations."'' 3 The court apparently placed great weight on
the implied covenant of good faith, which although not actually expressed in
the contract, is "as binding as the terms which are actually written."'" The
court obviously believed that the location of a competing franchisee, even if
two miles away, created a significant impairment to Scheck's expectation that
Burger King would "not act to destroy ... the fruits of the contract.' 0 5
The Southern District next addressed the territorial issue in Burger King
Corp. v. Weaver. 06 In Weaver, the franchisee had enjoyed a thirteen-year
relationship with the franchisor and ultimately owned three Burger King
franchises. 7 Subsequently, Burger King entered into a worldwide contract
with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) which allowed the
AAFES to unilaterally decide where to place new franchises. The franchisee

97. Scheck I, 756 F. Supp. at 545.
98. Burger King Corp. did not intend to build a new restaurant, but rather to convert a
Howard Johnson's restaurant into a Burger King franchise. Id.
99. Id. at 549 (quoting the Burger King franchise agreement).
100. Id. at 547. It is interesting to note that the court also denied Burger King's motion
for summary judgment that argued that a release previously executed by the parties barred
Scheck's claim. Id. at 546. The court reasoned that even if Scheck was aware of the
possibility that Burger King Corp. intended to convert the Howard Johnson restaurant, his
cause of action did not become ripe until Burger King acted on its intentions. Id. at 547.
Thus, the release did not bar Scheck's encroachment claim. Id.
101. Id. at 549.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 549.
106. 798 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Fla. 1992). This suit also encompassed franchise termination
issues that are not addressed by this article. See id. at 690-92.
107. Id. at 686.
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alleged that AAFES's placement of a Burger King franchise adjacent to a
military base in Great Falls, Montana caused a decline in profits at the
franchisee's two neighboring locations. The franchisee claimed that this
encroachment violated the franchise agreement's implied covenant of good
faith.' 8
The Weaver court examined the franchise agreements and found that one
agreement was completely silent on both parties' territorial rights and the
other agreement served only to deny "'any area, market or territorial rights
proprietary to franchisee." ' '
The Weaver court relied on its prior holding
in Scheck I and found that the express denial of territorial rights to the
franchisee did not simultaneously provide Burger King with unfettered
discretion in opening new restaurants at any location."' Moreover, the
court reasoned that because the agreement's language was susceptible to
different interpretations, the parole evidence rule did not bar the admission
of extrinsic evidence to elucidate its meaning."' Thus, the court found that
Burger King's "long standing policy against encroachment and cannibalization" militated the conclusion that the agreements did not grant
Burger King the absolute right to establish new franchises at any
location." 2
The Weaver court's holding necessitated the rejection of a Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision, which in a nearly identical case, found that the
franchise agreement did not limit Burger King's discretion. " 3 The Weaver
court reasoned that adoption of the Fourth Circuit's opinion would permit
Burger King to open new franchises at any location, even next door to
existing franchisees." 4 The court "entertain[ed] serious doubts about
whether a rational franchisee would ever enter into a franchise agreement

108. Id. at 686, 688. The franchisee's claim was actually a counter claim in a suit brought
by Burger King for failure to pay fees owed to the corporation. Id. at 686. The franchisee
perceived the encroachment as a violation of the agreement and refused to pay the fees sought
by Burger King. Id.
109. Id. at 687 (quoting the Burger King franchise agreement). The court initially stated
that the first agreement was silent on the territorial issue while acknowledging Burger King's
claim that it provided the franchisee the right to operate only at the "site specified." Id. In
either case, the court did not find that the agreement granted Burger King the right to open
new outlets at "any location it wishe[d]." Id. at 689. The second franchise agreement
provided in relevant part that '"this franchise is for the specified location only and does not

in any way grant or imply any area, market or territorial rights proprietary to franchisee."'
Id. at 687 (quoting the Burger King franchise agreement).
110. Id. at 689.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (rejecting the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Fickling
v. Burger King Corp., 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988) (Table)).
114. Id.
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a result
with Burger King.""' 5 The court apparently believed that such
116
parties.
the
of
expectations
reasonable
the
beyond
was
clearly
Eighteen months after its initial opinion, the Southern District Court
revisited Scheck I and denied Burger King's Motion to Reconsider." 7 In
Scheck I, the court reiterated that summary judgment was precluded because
the franchise agreement regarding Burger King's alleged absolute discretion
in locating new franchises"' was silent. The court allowed the franchisee
to present to the jury a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith. 19 In short, the court found no justification for ruling that the express
denial of
Scheck's right "expressly implied" an even greater right to Burger
0
King.

12

The court cautioned that its ruling did not offend the "oft-cited rule of
law that the covenant of good faith cannot be implied in derogation of the
express terms of a contract."' 2' The court went to great lengths to emphasize that its opinion did not even challenge the derogation principle
because Burger King "did not pursue an act expressly and specifically
authorized by the Franchise Agreement."1 22 In fact, the court pronounced
that if the franchise agreement had granted Burger King absolute discretion
in locating other franchises, the court most "likely" would have reached a
different conclusion. 23 Thus, while Scheck II signaled a victory for

115. Id.
116. Id. The Weaver court "believe[d] that to construe the franchise agreements in such
a fashion would run afoul of the principle that a contract contains such implied conditions as
are necessary to make sense of the contract." Id. (citing Market St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d
588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991)). It is important to note that the Fickling decision is still valid
precedent. The Weaver court simply found Fickling unpersuasive and chose to depart from
its reasoning. See id. The Weaver court reiterated its position on Fickling when it reexamined the Scheck decision. In Scheck I, the court cautioned that its rejection of Fickling
was not based on flawed reasoning by the Fourth Circuit, but was a different interpretation
of the Burger King franchise agreement. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 699. The Burger King
franchise agreement provided that 'this franchise is for the specified location only and does
not in any way grant or imply any area, market or territorial rights proprietary to franchisee."'
Weaver, 798 F. Supp. at 687 (quoting the Burger King franchise agreement). Both the Weaver
court and the Scheck II court found that the franchise agreement did not grant Burger King
"the clear right" to place new franchises at any location. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. at 689; Scheck
H1, 798 F. Supp. at 699.
117. Scheck II., 798 F. Supp. at 693.
118. The Scheck II court stated that "[i]t is evident that although the language of the
Franchise Agreement states that the franchisee cannot expect an exclusive territory, such
language does not even mention the franchisor, let alone does the language provide that
Burger King retains the unlimited right to establish Burger King franchises at any location
desired." Id. at 695.
119. Id.
120. Id. Or as it is written in Latin, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
121. Id. at 695.
122. Id. at 698, 700.
123. Id. at 697.
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franchisees, the implication that a franchisor could reserve "the right to be
predatory"' 24 emphasizes the courts' unwillingness to recognize the realities
of the modem franchise relationship.
V. GOOD FAITH AND THE INEQUITIES OF POWER IN FRANCHISE
RELATIONSHIPS

The Burger King trilogy 125 accurately reflects a franchisee's reasonable
expectations in the franchise relationship. A franchisee, after investing a
considerable sum in franchise fees and capital costs, does not expect the
franchisor to invade the marketplace that the parties have jointly
developed. 126 Thus, cases like Scheck I and Weaver, where the franchise
agreement does not grant the franchisor any rights to locate new franchises,
provide franchisees with the opportunity to utilize the power of the implied
covenant of good faith to reflect the franchisee's reasonable expectations in
the franchise relationship.
The covenant "imposes a duty on each party to do nothing to destroy the
right of the other party to enjoy the fruits of the contract."' 127 Further, the
covenant presumes that the parties will "'preserve the spirit of the contract
rather than the form and protect the reasonable expectations of the [other]
part[y]." ' 2 8 In Scheck I, the court reasoned that these obligations
prohibited Burger King from locating a new franchise two miles from an
established franchisee because of the negative impact on the existing
location. 29 When combined with Burger King's past policies against
encroachment, 3 ' Scheck I provided the court with the perfect factual

124. Id. at 700. The court further explained that "[i]f a franchise agreement gives the
franchisor the right to build (or permit building) another store next door to the one earlier
permitted, it had better say so in clear terms." Id. at 699-700.
125. The trilogy: Scheck I, 756 F. Supp. at 543; Weaver, 798 F. Supp. at 684; Scheck II,
798 F. Supp. at 692.
126. A franchisee may be precluded from arguing that the establishment of a new franchise
location was not within its reasonable expectations if the franchisee attempted to negotiate the
territorial clause prior to executing the franchise agreement. For further comment, see supra
note 86. It may be wise for a franchisee to remain silent on this issue during the negotiation
process and gamble that the franchisor will not seek to encroach upon its market. If the
franchisee negotiates the extent of its territorial protection, it will be difficult to then argue
that it was unaware of the franchisor's discretion to establish new locations. Evidence of the
franchisee's knowledge would be strongest in a case where the franchisee had successfully
negotiated an increase in its territorial protection. In such cases, the franchisee's agreement
would differ from the franchisor's standard agreement, thereby exposing the franchisee's
knowledge of the franchisor's contractual discretion.
127. Photovest, 606 F.2d at 728 (defining the implied covenant of good faith).
128. Scheck 11, 798 F. Supp. at 694 n.5 (citations omitted) (detailing the implied covenant
of good faith).
129. Scheck 1,756 F. Supp. at 549.
130. Id.
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scenario in which to apply the covenant because cannibalization was not
expressly within the expectations of either party.
Even in cases where the franchise agreement grants the franchisor
unfettered discretion, the reasonable expectation of the franchisee differs little
from the Scheck I scenario. For example, in Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., it is
more unlikely that the franchisee expected the franchisor to utilize its
discretion in opening new franchises to an extent that it would negatively
impact an existing franchisee location by twenty-seven percent.1 31 The
detrimental impact that such results have on a party's right to enjoy the fruits
of the contract is indisputable.
Courts, however, in light of long-standing contract principles, refuse to
interfere because parties can contractually sanction what would otherwise
violate the covenant of good faith. 132 Franchisors are well served by the
historical position that "'the obligation of good faith will not be implied in
derogation of the express terms of a contract."",133 Thus, franchisors seem
invulnerable to attack when protected by carefully drafted franchise
agreements.
VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

Attempts by franchisees to challenge franchise agreements on other
grounds also have failed to puncture the franchisor's armor. Because the
franchisee is dependent upon the franchisor for virtually every aspect of its
operation, from supplies to production methods to advertising, it seems
plausible that courts would impose a fiduciary duty upon franchisors to act
with the utmost good faith toward the franchisee and prohibit actions that
benefit the franchisor at the expense of the franchisee.' 34 The courts'
willingness to impose a fiduciary duty in the franchise relationship reached
its apex with the Eighth Circuit's 1979 decision in Arnott v. American Oil
Co. 3 In Arnott, the franchisee operated a twenty-four hour service station
under a one-year lease, which according to industry practice, was commonly
renewed as long as the franchisee operated the station in a reasonable

131. No. 92-C5852, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334 at *22 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1994), mot.
denied, count dismissed, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 338 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1994). Recall that the
NRC concluded that the loss in sales could reach 40%. Id.
132. See cases cited supra note 12.
133. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 695 (citation omitted).
134. A fiduciary duty requires "that neither party exert undue influence or pressure upon
the other, take selfish advantage of his trust or deal with the subject matter of the trust in such
a way as to benefit himself or prejudice the other except in the exercise of the utmost good
faith and with the full knowledge and consent of the other person involved." Amott v.
American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
135. Id. at 876.
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manner. 136 In violation of the franchise agreement, the franchisor misrepresented the benefits of installing a car wash and coerced the franchisee
to sell specific products and fix prices.' 7 During the 1973 nationwide gas
shortage, the franchisor could not supply enough gas to make twenty-four
hour operation profitable. 3 Consequently, when the franchisee refused to
operate at a loss by remaining open twenty-four hours a day, the franchisor
terminated the franchise agreement. 39 The court found that the franchisor
failed to act in good faith during the franchise relationship and breached its
fiduciary duty by terminating the franchise agreement without good
cause.140
The Arnott court recognized that the franchise relationship constituted a
commercial venture in which the franchisor and franchisee shared a common
interest in promoting goodwill and earning a profit.' 4 ' The court also noted
that the franchisor's dominant position compelled the franchisee, after
considerable investment of time and money, to rely upon the franchisor's
good faith in meeting its obligations by renewing the franchise
agreement. 42 Thus, the court found that the franchisor's inherent fiduciary
duty prohibited termination of the franchise relationship without good
cause.

143

Despite the compelling reasoning in Arnott, subsequent decisions refused
to find an inherent fiduciary duty in franchise relationships.'" Even the
Eighth Circuit retreated from its position by stating that "[w]hat [the Arnott
decision] actually decided was simply that Amoco's arbitrary termination of
Arnott's service station lease constituted a breach of Amoco's implied duty
of 'good faith and fair dealing."",145 This retreat probably stems from the
136. Id. at 877.
137. Id. at 878.
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id. at 878.
140. Id. at 884.
141. Id. at 881.
142. Id. at 882-83 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294 A.2d 253, 262 (N.J. 1972)).
143. Id. at 883.
144. E.g., Fashion Boutique v. Fendi USA Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544 (MGC), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9881, at * 17 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1992) (explaining that New York courts have not found
the franchisor-franchisee relationship to be fiduciary one); AAMCO Transmissions v. Marino,
No. 88-5522, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18380, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1991) (finding no
fiduciary duty in franchise context), partialsumm.judgement denied, No. 88-5522, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2081 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1992); Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Del Monte Corp., No.
CA3-88-3012-D, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18748 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1990) (stating that
"California courts have rejected claims that a franchisor-franchisee relationship by itself gives
rise to a fiduciary relationship"); Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497
F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that "[a] franchise relationship is inherently a
business relationship, not a fiduciary relationship"); see also RAu, supra note 8, at 1057
(detailing the demise of fiduciary duty in franchise relationships).
145. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982).
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rationale that the interests of the parties in a franchise relationship are not
always synonymous. The franchisor is concerned not only with the
profitability of the individual franchisee, but also with that of the entire
franchise system. For example, a franchisor decision to market or eliminate
a particular product may harm the profitability of a few franchisees but
benefit the franchise system as a whole. Accordingly, most courts refuse to
find a fiduciary duty in the franchise relationship."
An alternative approach, first expressed by Professor Gellhorn, 47
applies the doctrine of unconscionability to franchise termination cases. The
unconscionability test requires the terminated franchisee to show an
unreasonably disproportionate imbalance of power between the parties.
Professor Gellhorn reasoned that "the condition which creates the right to
terminate the agreement in one party must bear a reasonable relationship to
the risks sought to be allocated and the benefits granted by the
agreement."' 48 Arbitrary terminations ignore the franchisee's expenditures
of time and money, in dependence upon the franchisor's proven formula for
success. Professor Gellhorn explained that unconscionability was a viable
tactic in cases of unfair franchisor termination because the doctrine, originally
created to combat unscrupulous bargains, could not be circumvented by
express contractual terms. 49 Thus, Professor Gellhorn's unconscionability
theory seems to provide a remedy for the inequity resulting from arbitrary
franchisor termination.
Commentators criticize Professor Gellhorn's theory finding that
unconscionability traditionally is applied to the agreement at the time of the
bargain rather than during the contractual relationship. 150 At least one
court, however, has endorsed Professor Gellhorn's view. In Corenswet, Inc.
v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
"[w]hat public policy does abhor is economic overreaching [and] the use of
superior bargaining power to secure grossly unfair advantage.' 5 ' The

146. Rau, supra note 8, at 1061-62 (explaining that "[a] fiduciary duty nevertheless might
be found to exist where the dealings between a franchisor and its franchisee suggest that the
franchisee had reason to place particular confidence and trust in the franchisor").
147. Ernest Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights - Franchise
Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 505.
148. Id. at 512, 513.
149. Id. at 508.
150. Rau, supra note 8, at 1065 (stating that "[t]he absence of such use [of the unconscionability doctrine] may be due in large part to its focus on the fairness of the agreement
at the time it was negotiated rather than its application during the course of the franchise
relationship"). "Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at law if
it was 'such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and
as no honest and fair man would accept on the other."' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (citations omitted).
151. 594 F.2d 129, 139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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court concluded that unconscionability was the proper vehicle to "strike down
'unfair' contract terms.' 52 Unfortunately, the court did not use the
unconscionability doctrine to avoid the franchisor's termination of the
because the franchisee failed to press the
franchisee's distributorship
53
unconscionability issue.
Extension of Professor Gellhorn's unconscionability theory to the issue
of encroachment could serve to prevent franchisors from utilizing their
dominant position to gain an unfair advantage over franchisees. To
accomplish this, courts must be willing to abandon the strict application of
the doctrine. Instead, courts should consider whether a franchisee would
have entered the agreement had the franchisee known, at the time of the
bargain, that the franchisor would exercise its contractual discretion to
eliminate the franchisee's reasonable expectations of profitability. This
hindsight view imputes to the franchisee necessary knowledge at the time the
agreement is made to make an informed decision about whether to invest in
the franchise or seek another investment option. Only in hindsight can the
court truly determine whether the effects of encroachment are reasonably
reflected in the risks and benefits inherent in the franchise agreement or
whether the franchisee was unknowingly subjected to an unfair bargain
because of the franchisor's overreaching application of the contract's terms.
Further, the degree of harm is heightened in the encroachment context
because the franchisee is now stuck in an unconscionable relationship. A
termination clause reflects the parties reasonable expectations concerning the
franchise relationship. Where the franchise agreement allows the franchisor
to terminate for any reason, the franchisee has received adequate notice to
make an informed decision based on this risk and the cost of investment.
However, where the franchisor encroaches upon the franchisee's territory, the
franchisee is not relieved of contractual obligations; the franchisee, whose
profit margin may be severely reduced, if not eliminated, is still bound by the
agreement to operate the franchise and would technically be the breaching
party if it terminated the relationship.
Encroachment provides a means for the franchisor to effectively force the
franchisee to terminate the relationship because the franchisee can no longer
operate the location profitably. This forced termination allows the franchisor

152. Id.
153. Id. It is doubtful that the franchisee would have satisfied the court's unconscionability
test even if pursued. The Corenswet court would have required the franchisee to show that
it had no "meaningful choice" but to accept the contract, as well as that the termination clause
was "unreasonably favorable" to the franchisor. Id. (citations omitted). The court's approval
of this test is curious because Professor Gellhom's theory, which the court endorsed, implicitly
necessitates reviewing the agreement in hindsight rather than asking whether the franchisee
had a choice in accepting the contract. Id.
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to receive a windfall by operating both the franchisee's established
location"5 and the encroaching outlet. The unconscionability of the
agreement is now twofold because it not only substantially changes the nature
of the parties' reasonable expectations, but also may result in the franchisee's
insolvency. Ultimately, the franchisee is in the position it would have been
had it known of the consequences of encroachment that is without a
franchise. Now, however, the franchisee also must bear the economic loss
caused by the franchisor's actions that were not within the franchisee's
reasonable expectations.155
Unfortunately, the historical reluctance by the courts to apply the
unconscionability doctrine to franchise agreements156 indicates that an
extension of Professor Gellhorn's unconscionability theory would not easily
be accepted by the judiciary. The lasting effect of Corenswet, the only court
to endorse Professor Gellhorn's view, does not concern unconscionability, 157 but rather the implied covenant of good faith. Courts still adhere to
the Corenswet position, which dictates that the implied covenant of good
faith cannot be used to "override or strike express contract terms."' 58 Since
contractual remedies have proven ineffective in combating explicit grants of
unfettered franchisor discretion in placing new locations, franchisees must
look to the legislature for relief.
VII.
A.

PENDING LEGISLATION

Proposalsby the U.S. Congress and the Florida Legislature

A franchise bill is currently pending5 9 in the U.S. House of Representatives.16 The bill is intended to strengthen current federal law and protect
consumers in the sale of franchises by establishing minimum standards of

154. This assumes that the franchisor will operate the outlet and not sell the existing
location to another franchisee. If the pre-existing franchisee's profit margin is eliminated then
perhaps the franchisor, free of franchise fees, could profitably operate the location.
Conceivably, the franchisor could sell the pre-existing location at a cost reflecting the
encroachment's effect on sales, which would result in lower debt service payments for the new
franchisee and restore the profit margin.
155. The risk of loss is present in any business; economic loss is typically the result of
natural market forces. When an investment goes sour because of encroachment by a
franchisor, the loss becomes unconscionable. The encroaching franchisor, who once offered
guidance, support, and a proven formula for profitable operation, has abused its contractual
discretion in a manner well beyond the reasonable expectations of the franchisee.
156. See Rau, supra note 8, at 1065.
157. See Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 138.
158. Id.
159. LEXIS Bill Tracking Report, executed on Aug. 8, 1996, indicates that the last action
taken on the bill was May 25, 1995 when it was referred to the House Judiciary Committee.
160. H.R. 1717, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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franchisor conduct, 6 ' requiring more extensive disclosure 62 and collecting data regarding franchise system performance for public use. 63 The
proposed legislation forbids encroachment that will result in a reduction of
gross sales of more than five percent during the twelve-month period
immediately following establishment of the new location."64 Existing
franchisees must file their claims within the eighteen months following the
opening and operation of the new outlet. 65 The encroaching franchisor
must compensate the franchisee for any loss of sales in excess of five percent
for as long as the new outlet remains in operation."s The franchisor would
bear the burden of proof to show that the existing franchisee's sales declined
because of reasons other than encroachment.' 67 Finally, the bill imposes
a duty upon each party to act in good faith and "to do nothing that will have
the effect of destroying68or injuring the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the contract."'1
The federal proposal suffers from a serious ailment. It applies to
encroachment that reduces the existing franchisee's gross sales by five
percent or more. 69 Franchising expert Harold Brown explains that "a
typically successful fast-food franchise .. . [may have only] an 8 percent
profit [margin].' 170 Given this very slim margin, even a one percent
decrease in profit is significant. In cases where encroachment results in
losses of less than five percent, the federal legislation would be useless even
though the franchisee is destined for financial disaster.
Unfortunately, drawing the line where franchisor encroachment becomes
unreasonable is a difficult task. Numerous factors, such as, demand for
goods, cost of goods, competition from other franchisees, and operating
expenses must be considered in the encroachment equation. Because these
factors vary greatly among different industries, markets, and geographic
regions, it is not feasible to accurately determine at what point franchisor
encroachment becomes unreasonable.

161. Id. § 5.
162. Id. § 3(b).
163. Id. § 13.
164. Id. § 8(a)-(c)(1).
165. Id. § 8(e).
166. Id. § 8(b).
167. Id. § 8(d)(2). The franchisor may escape liability under the bill by providing the
existing franchisee with the right of first refusal for the new location on the same terms
offered to the new franchisee, id. § 8(c)(2), or by agreeing to compensate the existing
franchisee for any loss of sales caused by the new outlet. Id. § 8 (c)(3).
168. Id. § 5(a)(2).
169. Id. § 8(a), (c)(1).
170. Brown, supra note 3, at 3.
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B. An Alternative Solution
A better approach begins with a determination of which party will bear
the burden of proof concerning the reasonableness of encroachment. In cases
where a court determines that a franchise agreement clearly details both the
extent of the franchisee's territorial rights and the degree of franchisor
discretion in placing new locations, the franchisee should bear the initial
burden of proving that the encroachment is unreasonable. 7' To carry this
burden the franchisee must first prove that the encroachment caused a
decrease in gross sales.'
Second, the franchisee must establish that a
reasonable franchisee' would not have entered the agreement had it
known, prior to contract execution, that the franchisor would utilize its
contractual discretion to encroach upon the franchisee's market to the degree
established in step one. The franchisee may choose to establish its losses by
projections from an independent marketing company 74 or by a comparison
of earnings before and after encroachment. Similarly, the franchisee may
present financial experts to establish whether the risk and return of franchise
investing are reasonable given franchisor encroachment.
After consideration of the franchisee's arguments, and surrounding facts
and circumstances, the court must determine whether the franchisee carried
its burden and established a rebuttable presumption that the encroachment
was unreasonable. The franchisor could rebut the presumption by showing
that the decrease in gross sales was caused by natural market forces, such as,
decreased demand for the particular good or service, or increased competition
from other franchise systems. The franchisor must establish that the
franchisee was fully aware of the franchisor's right under the franchise
agreement to establish new locations. If the franchisor meets this burden, the
franchisee still may prevail by proving that encroachment caused the decrease

171. Placing the ultimate burden on the franchisee, where the franchise agreement is clear
and unambiguous, gives deference to the parties' rights to freely contract. This seems proper
given the courts' long-standing reluctance to use the implied covenant of good faith in
derogation of express terms. E.g., Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 138 (declining to apply the implied
covenant of good faith against clear language contained in the franchise agreement).
172. This encroachment test purposefully omits a specific numerical decrease requirement
for a franchisee to bring an encroachment claim. This alleviates the problem caused by the
10% rule in cases where a franchisee's net profit is less than 10% prior to the encroachment.
The absence of a numerical standard will not open the flood gates of litigation; given the high
costs of litigation, a franchisee will bring suit only where the decrease in sales substantially
affects its profits.
173. Courts typically engage in such analysis. For example, tort actions are judged against
the reasonable person standard.
174. Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 92-C5852, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 334 at *19 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 10, 1994), mot. denied, count dismissed, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 338 (N.D. II1.Jan. 10,
1994). For example, see the discussion of Cohn at supra note 72.
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in gross sales. The franchisee also must establish that even if it were aware
of the franchisor's rights to establish new locations, it did not reasonably
expect the encroachment to result in losses to the extent previously
established.
If, however, the agreement fails to clearly define the parties' territorial
rights, the franchisor should bear the burden of proving the reasonableness
of the encroachment. 7 5 Regardless, the plaintiff, that is, the franchisee
must first establish that a decrease in gross sales was caused by encroachment. The franchisee may choose to establish its losses by projections from
an independent marketing company or by a comparison of the franchisee's
earnings before and after encroachment. The franchisee's establishment of
loss in earnings creates a rebuttable presumption that the encroachment is
unreasonable.
In response, the franchisor must establish the following: (1) the decrease
in gross sales was caused by natural market forces, such as, decreased
demand for the particular good or increased competition from other franchise
systems; (2) the franchisee was fully aware that the franchisor might choose
to locate new locations within a distance of the franchisee's market area that
could affect the franchisee's gross sales; and (3) the franchisee reasonably
expected that encroachment would occur and anticipated the full extent to
which encroachment could affect gross sales in deciding whether to enter the
franchise relationship. If the franchisor meets this burden, the franchisee
must establish that it was not aware of the franchisor's intention to establish
new locations or the extent to which it would affect gross sales.
The tests outlined above provide a better solution to the encroachment
issue because they are not limited by fixed numerical standards. A flexible
framework, in which the court determines the reasonableness of franchisor
encroachment based on all surrounding facts and circumstances,' 76 will
allow courts to apply the tests to all franchise systems. Furthermore, the tests
provide ample protection for both franchisors and franchisees. In cases
where the franchise agreement is carefully drafted, the franchisor would need
to show that the franchisee was fully aware of the franchisor's rights to place
new locations and of the potential effects on gross sales in order to establish
that its location of a new franchise does not constitute unreasonable
encroachment. However, where the agreement's language concerning
territorial rights is ambiguous, the franchisor must satisfy a more difficult
burden of establishing the reasonableness of its new location. In short, the

175. Ambiguity in the franchise agreement is construed against the drafter. Only where
the franchise agreement clearly grants the franchisor unfettered discretion should deference
be given to its ability to locate new franchises at will.
176. Avoiding rigid numerical standards allows a court to consider numerical standards
appropriate to the specific industry and market involved.
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tests provide an equitable framework in which encroachment is judged by the
particular facts and circumstances of each franchise dispute.
VIII.

LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS: GOOD FAITH TRIUMPHS OVER
CONTRACT TERMS

The most promising component of pending franchise laws is the
legislative willingness to prohibit encroachment, notwithstanding express
contractual terms. Moreover, the legislation would impose a duty of good
faith upon franchisors that would obligate the franchisor to refrain from an
act that would destroy the franchisee's right to enjoy the reasonably
anticipated fruits of the franchise agreement. It is uncertain whether these
legislative obligations could be constitutionally imposed upon franchise
agreements executed prior to the legislation's enactment into law.
Franchisors in Iowa successfully challenged the retroactive application of
similar legislation on the grounds that it materially changed the nature of a
previously bargained for contract.' 77 Nonetheless, the pending laws send
a clear signal to the courts that public policy mandates the prohibition of
encroachment that results in an unreasonable exercise of contractual
discretion.
Courts addressing encroachment cases should heed the legislative
mandate that encroachment is not within the reasonable expectations of the
franchisee. Franchise case law indicates that courts already may be aware of
this proposition but simply refuse to extend the implied covenant of good
faith to its logical conclusion. 78 The Arnott and Cornswet decisions
accurately reflect the realities of franchise relationships. The franchisor is
indeed in a dominate position, even if only after the execution of the
franchise agreement. The franchisee, after expending considerable capital
and time to operate a franchise outlet, is extremely vulnerable to the whims
of the franchisor. In effect, the franchisee is stranded and must rely upon the
franchisor to act in good faith to ensure the franchisee's continued success.
As a result of cases such as Cornswet, Arnott, and Photovest, it is clear
that courts recognize that encroachment violates the reasonable expectations

177. McDonald's Corp. v. Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597, 607 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (finding that
the retroactive application of franchising laws violated "the parties' contractual rights in the
agreements in existence at the time the Act became effective"), af'd, 29 F.3d 383 (1994).
178. E.g., Weaver, 798 F. Supp. at 689 (stating that the court would "entertain[] serious
doubts about whether a rational franchisee would ever enter into a franchise agreement" that
gave the franchisor discretion to "set up a competing franchise next door to an existing
franchise"); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 602 (N.J. 1973) (finding that
"the provisions of the [franchise agreement] giving [the franchisor] the right to terminate its
business relationship with [the franchisee], almost at will, are the result of [the franchisor's]
disproportionate bargaining position and are grossly unfair"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920
(1974).
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of the franchisee and constitutes an abuse of contractual discretion by the
dominantly positioned franchisor. As Cohn illustrates, however, courts still
refuse to vindicate violations of the franchisee's reasonable expectations in
cases where the franchise agreement specifically grants the franchisor
unfettered discretion in locating new franchises. The time has come for
courts to look beyond traditional contract law and utilize the implied
covenant of good faith to protect the franchisee's reasonable expectations.
The bridge between the implied covenant of good faith and express
grants of unfettered franchisor discretion is easily crossed by the well-settled
notion that contractual discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent
with the parties reasonable expectations.' 79 Even in cases where the
franchisee specifically is denied any territorial protection, it clearly is
unreasonable to suggest that a party would enter a long-term contractual
agreement, requiring the expenditure of substantial time and money, while
assuming the risk that the other party may at any time act to completely
destroy its contractual benefits. Accordingly, the Scheck notion that a party
may contractually reserve the right to be predatory contradicts the sound
reasoning that the franchisee would not have entered into such a contract had
the true ramifications of the franchisor's predatory powers been known.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Presently, the judiciary adamantly refuses to apply the implied covenant
of good faith to prohibit franchisor encroachment in cases where the
franchisor is granted absolute discretion in locating new franchises. This
position reflects neither current public policy concerns nor prior judicial
holdings regarding the realities of franchise relationships. Photovest and
Scheck squarely hold that, where the franchisor does not reserve unfettered
discretion, encroachment is not an action reasonably anticipated by the
franchisee. Even in cases where such discretion is explicitly defined in the
agreement, the franchisee's expectations remain unchanged. It is difficult to
imagine that the franchisee in Cohn would have entered the franchise
relationship had he known that the franchisor could act to reduce its gross
sales by forty percent.
The implied covenant of good faith provides the most logical means of
preserving the true nature of the franchise bargain. While risk is a part of
every business relationship, the reasonable franchisee would not enter a

179. Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that
under Florida law "a party vested with contractual discretion must exercise that discretion
reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner
inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties") (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
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franchise relationship knowing that the contract allows the franchisor to
utilize its discretion to bring about the franchisee's demise. Indeed, it is most
unlikely that even a franchisor could reasonably expect a franchisee to
execute a franchise agreement with the expectation that the franchisor might
one day "act to destroy the right of the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the
contract."' 0

180. Scheck I, 756 F. Supp. at 549 (citations omitted) (stating that a franchisee without
exclusive territorial rights is still entitled to protection from franchisor actions that would
destroy the franchisee's reasonable expectations of profit).
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